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ABSTRACT
This paper applies the theoretical work of Frantz Fanon to discuss healthcare as an institution
that upholds the will of the dominant authority in the contemporary United States. The use of Fanon’s
work outside of its original context is justified by applying the internal colonialism theory. Correctional
healthcare is discussed as an area of overtly controlling and dehumanizing medical care, highlighting
caregiver loyalty to correctional authority and reciprocal distrust between prison physicians and
patients. This inquiry proposes that clinical healthcare displays the same power relationships through
loyalty to the business of healthcare and the reciprocal distrust between physicians and patients as
caregivers strive for an unachievable objectivity of care. Both the correctional and the clinical
healthcare sections establish that medicine exists in collaboration with the governing body because: 1)
medicine is provided by those in power and they get to determine the boundaries of its provision and,
2) individual caregivers uphold this structure by complying with the dominant interests. Further, both
these arenas of study demonstrate that by upholding the will of those in power, interpersonal relations
within medical care reproduce the oppressed-oppressor dynamic. This paper advocates for the use of
Fanon’s work within the contemporary United States contexts and argues that we should understand
medical institutions as powerful and socio-politically situated, rather than infallible and absolute.

KEYWORDS: medicine, healthcare, Frantz Fanon, internal colonialism, correctional healthcare,
clinical healthcare, dual loyalty
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“Science depoliticized, science in service of man, is often non-existent in the colonies.”
-

Frantz Fanon

A Dying Colonialism 1965, p. 140

INTRODUCTION
Medical institutions hold enormous power over the health and well-being of those who
depend on them for care. As such, it is critical to understand the institution of medicine as socially
constructed within a specific political and social context, rather than an unchanging and objective
phenomenon. Western conceptions of medicine uphold science as impartial, and this understanding
ignores the broader social factors that shape medical knowledge creation and the subjective
application of medical care. It is difficult to highlight the motives that have created and bounded
medical care in the United States, both presently and historically, because the dominant discourse
frames medical oppression in a way that obscures the existence of an oppressor. In this paper, I
suggest that understanding the role of medical institutions in colonial contexts allows for a clearer
understanding of medicine as a tool of oppression, and I encourage greater scrutiny of how the
institution of medicine is used to impose the will of the dominant class in the United States.
This project faces one major challenge: the mechanisms of control and subjugation that the
institution of healthcare employs are covert in the United States. The linchpin of the present inquiry
is the work of physician and political philosopher Frantz Fanon and his ruminations on the structure
of hegemonic colonial oppression in Algeria and how that manifests in medical care. While the
works of Fanon that are primarily used in political and historical discourse communities discuss
colonial racism and interpersonal colonized-colonizer dynamics more broadly, his book A Dying
Colonialism (1965) specifically addresses the colonial situation in Algeria and the context that led to
the struggle for Algerian liberation from the occupying French. It is in a chapter of this work,
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entitled “Medicine and Colonialism,” that Fanon conceptualizes the role of healthcare in colonial
domination, and it is this chapter that will serve as this paper’s primary source of Fanon’s theory.
The use of Fanon’s work throughout this paper will elucidate that medicine is an institution
that is controlled by those in power—and is capable of enforcing the will of the dominant authority.
It is easier to see the relationship of control within the colonial context because there exists a clear,
occupying oppressor that enforces their systems onto the people they colonize. The present analysis
will elucidate how U.S. healthcare is likewise used as a tool of the oppressor. I argue that medicine’s
role in upholding the will of hegemonic authority challenges the presumption that medical care in
the contemporary United States is altruistic and impartial. Further, I use Fanon’s consideration of
the doctor-patient relationship as an enactment of the oppressor-oppressed power relationship to
highlight the interpersonal manifestations of the inequitable structure of U.S. healthcare.
Taking Fanon’s observations out of their original colonial context is not done lightly; the
very specific harm that has occurred via European colonization is not something that should be
watered-down nor used for superficial comparison. What I depict within the U.S. institution of
medicine will never be a direct comparison to the specific colonial context in Algeria, but the power
dynamics at play warrant the application of the process of colonialism. In the second section of this
paper, I discuss the theory of internal colonialism. Used by academic theorists and radical activists
alike, this theory posits that Black people in America are currently colonized through many of the
same tactics as traditional external colonialism: namely social, political, and economic subjugation.
Demonstrating that racial relationships in the United States warrant consideration as colonial
relationships through similar modes of oppression, I argue that taking Fanon’s work outside of its
original context is not only justified but critical to our understanding of dominance and deliberate
disadvantage.
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In the interest of clarifying this theoretical background, I begin by discussing medical care
within correctional healthcare facilities. Prisons serve as my primary area of analysis because they are
both geographically and socially removed from larger society, and this isolation allows for a clearer
picture of the oppressor-oppressed relationship. Advancing Fanon’s understanding of healthcare as
a tool of authority, I illustrate that correctional caregivers face conflicting loyalty to both the prison
administration and to the needs of their incarcerated patients. Understanding that correctional
caregivers primarily serve the interests of the prison fosters a reciprocal distrust between the doctor
and the patient. Though this inquiry acknowledges and engages the oppressive dynamics that exist
on a relational level, the focus is not on interpersonal bias but rather on clarifying that the
relationship between these roles is fundamentally a result of the structure of the institution of
medicine.
This paper is heavily inspired by the work of Andrea Pitts, who engaged with Fanon’s work
to highlight the structural and interpersonal exhibitions of power within correctional healthcare.
Their work was integral to the foundation of this inquiry, and I expand upon their approach by
addressing this same relationship outside of the walls of correctional facilities. Focusing on the
institution of medicine and the formation of contemporary medical knowledge in the United States,
the final section of this paper will clarify the enormous power that medical institutions hold over
patients through the provision of everyday clinical care. The covert nature of clinical oppression
obscures these conflicts, but this paper will expose them by depicting this relationship in clinical care
as a direct parallel to that of correctional healthcare. Mirroring the idea of contrasting loyalty
between authority and patient needs, I first discuss bureaucratic interests that have control over the
boundaries of care provision—placing my focus on insurance as a network that asymmetrically and
amorally restricts care. The existence of dehumanization and reciprocal distrust in the context of
clinical care is established by acknowledging the subjective and partisan nature of medical knowledge
6

and the tense oppressor-oppressed relationship this fosters. By analogizing the correctional and the
clinical contexts, I highlight the control that is present in everyday clinical healthcare and suggest
that we question the role of medical institutions in order to recognize them as a part of the
imposition of power, rather than objective and infallible entities.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Frantz Fanon
A thorough incorporation of Fanon’s theoretical work naturally requires a more complete
picture of the context in which he engaged. Born and raised in the French colony of Martinique,
Fanon’s initial observations on being a Black man living under colonial rule came from a place of
personal experience—a trend that continued in his work as he invariably rooted his political and
philosophical critiques of colonial domination in the lived experiences of the colonized. Fanon’s
phenomenological approach is one of his greatest strengths as it grounds his political theory in
examples that highlight both the internal and the relational complexities of the French colonial
situation in Martinique and Algeria (Pitts 2018). Because of his later involvement in fighting for
Algerian independence from France and his advocacy that violent colonization and control should be
met with violent revolt, his work is primarily utilized by scholars of political science and post-colonial
theory. It is also essential to understand Fanon’s own liminal position in Algeria as a Black man in a
position of colonial power as a highly educated psychiatrist among predominantly French doctors.
Scholar Richard Keller argues that an interpretation of Fanon is incomplete and insufficient if it
positions his work as a psychiatrist as a secondary feature of his legacy rather than the “linchpin of his
career,” because it was in the clinical setting that Fanon was able to observe colonial relationships
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between Algerian patients and French doctors—strengthening his assessment of the power
imbalances inherent in relationships with colonial authority (2007:826).
In “Medicine and Colonialism,” Fanon documents the distrust that colonized people of
Algeria had for all the representatives of colonial authority, clarifying that healthcare is necessarily and
inextricably linked to the other systems of control within a colonial context. Asserting that every
position of colonial power (e.g., doctor, policeman, schoolteacher) blurs together for the colonized in
an “almost organic confusion,” Fanon indicates that when Algerians are forced (physically and
emotionally) into situations outside of their control, they consider any piece of that coercive force to
be working against them (1965:121). Ultimately it does not matter what the specific vocation nor
impact of each of these roles is, for these positions are held by French people who hold positions of
power that have been imposed involuntarily on Algerian communities. Visits from doctors were
“preceded by the assembling of the population through the agency of the police authorities,” which
therefore renders any physical benefit of the medicine secondary to the traumatic and coercive devices
utilized to force this alleged care onto the colonized (Fanon 1965:121). Though there are numerous
examples of care being mandated in this way in the ordinary clinical treatment of Algerian patients,
the interactions that Fanon documents in A Dying Colonialism are the most directly and unmistakably
repressive examples of the collaboration between healthcare and policing because they specifically
address control amidst the Algerian war for liberation. Doctors were legally obligated to give the police
the name and address of Algerian patients who came in with a wound that appeared as though it could
have occurred while they were fighting the occupying armed forces of the French. This direct state
repression served its purpose in that Algerian revolutionaries stopped seeking treatment from the
colonizing doctors and began providing the necessary first aid work on themselves, which was met
with French orders that pharmacists could not sell tools such as alcohol, cotton, antibiotics, or antitetanus serum. Though these examples are extreme due to their context within a war for liberation,
8

they confirmed for the Algerian people that “the colonizers were in complete agreement to fight
against them” (Fanon 1965:136). The ability of the French authorities to dictate what the doctors
legally must do demonstrates the enormous power of the dominant class to shape the rules of medical
treatment in a way that benefits them and completely disregards the medical needs of those for whom
they allegedly provide care.
Recounting the history of the French occupying presence in Algeria, Fanon elucidates that this
reciprocal distrust and the desire to control the bodies of the colonized is not unique to the context
of revolution. The colonized Algerian often held a deep distrust for the French doctor, in direct
contrast with how Fanon insisted medicine could and should be. Fanon acknowledges that “in a noncolonial society, the attitude of the sick man in the presence of a medical practitioner is one of
confidence. The patient trusts the doctor; he puts himself in his hands. He yields his body to him”
(1965:123). This concept of consent and yielding your body by conscious choice to someone who has
your best interest in mind is something that noticeably does not and cannot exist in a colonial context.
The nature of colonialism makes it so that this trust is impossible because the colonial doctor has the
interests of the colonizing majority in mind over and above the needs of the Algerian patient. Algerian
patients recognized this and “refused to send him to the hospital of the whites, of strangers, of the
conqueror,” often until it was already too late for any medical care to heal them; this fundamental
wariness “is always more or less related to that lingering doubt as to the colonial doctor’s essential
humanity” (Fanon 1965:125, 124). In the case that colonized patients did seek medical treatment from
French hospitals, they were often diffident and yielded neither their bodies nor their
thoughts/opinions to the doctor because there was both a lack of trust and a desire to make the
process as quick as possible.
An unwillingness on behalf of the patient to yield their pain and their concerns to the white
doctor was interpreted as an inability to understand their own health, contributing to Western doctors’
9

belief that they were inherently more knowledgeable than the colonized people they treated. The idea
of these white, Western ‘professionals’ as being “superior knowers” on which the colonized people
depended not only directly influenced the way medical care was imposed on them, but also upheld
the idea that colonized societies would have been worse off without the colonial presence (Pitts
2015:285). Reasonable diffidence on the side of the patient was read as stupidity, unwillingness, and
petulance—contributing to the reciprocal distrust between the doctor and the patient. Fanon
documents how “the doctor rather quickly gave up the hope of obtaining information from the
colonized patient and fell back on the clinical examination . . . with these people you couldn’t practice
medicine, you had to be a veterinarian” (1965:126, 127). Not only was this a flawed medical approach,
as it is an incomplete analysis of medical needs, but the colonized body also often physically resisted
the doctor as much as they did mentally (Pitts 2015:282). By believing their feelings inferior and their
bodies rigid things to be studied independently of the patient’s whole person, the colonial doctor
established the Algerian as other—the interaction was no longer doctor-patient but instead became
subject-object.

Internal Colonialism
Fanon’s A Dying Colonialism was intended to show that “colonialism has definitely lost out in
Algeria, while the Algerians, come what may, have definitely won,” even though the Algerian War of
liberation was not yet over (1965:31). There are many ways to defeat colonialism. To fight, to be in
solidarity with your people, to stand in the face of the colonizer’s systems and say that you do not
need them—this was Fanon’s position when he suggested that Algerians were already victorious. That
victory over oppression can take many forms is an insightful stance, scholars have likewise argued that
oppression itself is not uniform; “there is no ‘post’ in colonialism” because the cessation of direct
colonial control does not necessarily mean the end of oppression (Allen 2005:10). Internal
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colonialism, alternatively referred to as internal neocolonialism or domestic colonialism, is a theory
that posits that colonial power relationships exist “not only international[ly] but intranational[ly]”
(González Casanova 1965:27). This paper seeks to use this theory to conceptualize the structural and
systemic subjugation Black people experience within the contemporary United States by clarifying that
their situation is that of a domestic colony and elaborating the way this colonial power relationship
specifically affects the institution of healthcare.
Allen’s (2005) commentary on the aftermath of colonialism refers to countries that were once
externally colonized and the dynamics that take shape after they have successfully (at least nominally)
gained independence; the same case can be made for Black Americans because their situation of
oppression has become less overt over time since the United States’ history of horrific enslavement,
exploitation, and subhuman treatment. That Black-white relationships in the United States began with
control and forced dependency—albeit in a slightly different form than traditional external
colonialism—set up the same pattern that then shifted into a sneakier version that has been termed
internal colonialism.
The theory of the internal colony suggests that racial minorities are subjected to the same
exploitative systems that European powers impose on their external colonies. Rather than the
colonizing force enacting this absolute power on extraneous countries, it instead exists within the country
of the colonial power. Despite the difference in the locality of control, the same colonial relationship
can be seen, and the process of colonization is enacted and upheld in the same way. The internal colony
thesis is not monolithic in its application, with the discourse community being somewhat divided on
what counts as an internal colony. Some scholars have argued that internal colonies must be
geographically bounded regions, like Kenneth Clark’s famed assessment of ghettos as “social, political,
educational, and-above-all-economic colonies” (1965:11). This approach is valuable because
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considering neatly bounded regions as colonies would have a great political advantage in terms of
advocating for their liberation and autonomy (Pinderhughes 2010).
Utilized differently within different areas of scholarship, the internal colonialism theory often
simply comments on class stratification and primarily economic inequality—but I will be using the
lens employed by ethnic studies to highlight the colonial process that shapes the subjugation of
minority groups. For the purposes of the present argument, my interpretation of this theory will be
aligned with the work of Robert L. Allen, W.E.B. Du Bois, Harold Cruse, and numerous Black political
revolutionaries like Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael, who considered Black people, as a single
diasporic colony, to be “a nation within a nation” (Cruse as cited in Allen 2005:2).
In the 1960s, internal colonialism was an important theory within activist circles—heavily used
by revolutionary nationalists to advocate for Black liberation (Allen 2005). The idea of liberation itself
stems from the understanding of Black people as a colonized people who are actively oppressed by
the systems that forcibly govern them. Using language like this makes clear the connection between
this colonial situation and that of classical external colonialism; considering that Fanon’s A Dying
Colonialism was written during the Algerian struggle for liberation, the mirrored patterns of a materially
and socially oppressed people fighting to break these chains become apparent. The calls for Black
Power and a desire for liberation never resulted in war as it did in Algeria. These revolutionary ideas
in the United States were tamped down by the more covert and insidious tactics of neoliberalism—
and offering minor concessions to quell the more radical voices that were beginning to be heard. The
promotion of Black capitalism and the minuscule concession of putting select Black people into
middle-class positions of power attempted to conceal the relationship of oppression by nominally
lessening the direct subjugation (Allen 2005). These tactics were effective. They quelled some of the
less radical voices by making it seem as though victory over oppression could be won through these
approved avenues and that there was not a need for liberatory rebellion (Allen 2005). The colonial
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power relationship that shows up in the “territorial concentration, spatial segregation, external
administration, the disparity between their legal citizenship and de facto second-class standing, their
brutalization by the police, and the toxic effects of racism in their lives” (Gutiérrez 2004:282) did not
disappear under this neoliberal veneer of progress: it simply became more covert.
The positionality of Black people as an internal colony in the United States is demonstrably
and concretely similar to the colonial situation discussed by Fanon. By using these theories in
combination with one another, I will argue that the “coloniality of power” is at work in the
contemporary United States and that it permeates every system and institution to structurally
disadvantage Black people (Grosfugel as cited in Allen 2005:10). In my utilization of the internal
colonialism theory, I am demonstrating that Fanon’s observations are applicable outside of their
traditional colonial context and are crucial to understanding the colonial relationship that exists within
the United States.

CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE
As previously established, one of Fanon’s major critiques of healthcare was that it existed in
total collaboration with other pieces of the colonial system. Nowhere in the United States is this
same pattern more unmistakable than in the correctional system’s provision of medical care for
those incarcerated. While this section will discuss the power relationships and ethical conflicts that
comprise institutional correctional healthcare generally (i.e., within both jails and prisons), my
primary focus will be on prisons. As prisons are the most heavily researched and, as the site of more
long-term incarceration, prisons provide the most relevant examples of the total control that
correctional medical care has over its patients. As a ‘total institution’ (Goffman 1962), prison ensures
that every element of life for those incarcerated is bounded and controlled by the correctional
authority. Given that prisoners are stripped of nearly every liberty upon entering the carceral system,
13

the 1926 court case Spicer v. Williamson elaborated that the burden of medical care fell to the
correctional administration, establishing that “the state removes the individual from his usual
societal conditions and places him under conditions which deprive him of the ability to help himself.
. .having assumed this guardianship, the state is under obligation to care for the needs of the
individual while he is deprived of the opportunity to care for himself” (Kipnis 2012:377-378). To
call again upon the language of the internal colony theoretical framework, prisons exist as an internal
colony in the most strict, geographically bounded sense as hegemonized institutions that have
perimeters and are removed from a society that benefits from their subjugation. In addition to fitting
the geographically-specific definition advanced by Pinderhughes (2010), prisons also still align with
Allen’s consideration of colonization in the United States as controlling Black people more broadly
as Black people and people of color are overrepresented in the prison population; in 2019, there
were “1,096 sentenced black prisoners per 100,000 black residents, 525 sentenced Hispanic
prisoners per 100,000 Hispanic residents, and 214 sentenced white prisoners per 100,000 white
residents in the U.S.” (U.S. Department of Justice 2020).
Though correctional facilities and their governing administrative bodies are responsible for
the provision of care, the guidelines on the quality of this care are inconsistent and only loosely
obeyed (Sufrin, Kolbi-Molinas, and Roth 2015). Select international organizations attempt to
provide comprehensive and detailed boundaries for what can be considered ethical health care in
prisons, this includes the “United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe, the World Medical
Association, the International Council of Nurses, Physicians for Human Rights, and Penal Reform
International” (Pont, Stöver, and Wolff 2012:475). Several of their central and overlapping principles
consist of basic ethical considerations such as informed consent and confidentiality. The UN more
clearly lays out boundaries of activities that correctional medical personnel in the prisons should not
do as they would constitute a breach of medical ethics; largely advocating that medical staff should
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remain committed purely to the health and well-being of their patients and should not take on tasks
that the prison wants, such as performing cavity searches, collecting lab samples for drug-detection,
and breaking hunger strikes (Pont et al. 2012). Because these regulations are considered “soft law,”
correctional facilities are not legally obligated to follow them and instead consider them to be loose
recommendations (Pont et al. 2012:477). Prisons in the United States legally need only follow
national law governing incarceration, of which there are notably few. The 1976 court case Estelle v.
Gamble is really the only standard for the quality of care that must be provided, this case purely
stipulates that “deliberate indifference” to serious medical needs would constitute cruel and unusual
punishment which is protected against by the Eighth Amendment (Estelle v. Gamble 1976). The
mandate that prisons cannot expressly and deliberately deny medical care serves as the only
standard, with no federal legislation regulating the quality nor consistency of care; prisons and jails
can be accredited by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC), but it is
purely voluntary to participate in their evaluations (Sufrin et al. 2015). Outside of individual court
cases seeking to prove deliberate indifference in their or a loved one’s treatment in a correctional
facility, there is virtually no accountability for prisons that do not provide their inmates with ethical
medical care.
Individual-level medical malpractice by prison healthcare providers certainly occurs
(Sonenstein 2015b), but the present analysis seeks to highlight more broadly that, at the system level,
the driving force behind the provision of correctional healthcare is dependence and control. Some
of the most horrific and headline-grabbing atrocities, like the shackling of women in labor (Ahrens
2015) or sending armed guards to the hospital alongside extremely ill patients (Sonenstein 2015a)
speak to the fundamental dehumanization of incarcerated people and the need to control them even
when they are at their most vulnerable. The often-reluctant provision of medical care is not guided
by altruistic concern for those incarcerated, rather it is a burden that must be done so that the
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correctional administration can keep inmates incarcerated and ensure they are capable of doing the
labor the facility demands of them.
Prisons take various routes to find medical staff to work at their facilities, one of the popular
tactics is to contract a private company whose express purpose is to provide physicians and cover
the costs of correctional medical care at a lowered cost to the county that employs them. Sonenstein,
in his 2015 three-part exposé “Gaming the System,” focused heavily on the company Advanced
Correctional Healthcare (ACH) and the decisions they make on what level of care to provide
inmates. The ACH very intentionally does not provide the same level of care that the people
incarcerated would receive outside of prison—despite organizations like the European Committee
for the Prevention of Torture deeming that an essential principle of ethical care. One of the most
relevant examples of this being their restrictions on any elective treatments. By barring treatment of
any condition that is not directly life-threatening, they are needlessly preventing people from
achieving a certain freedom of health care that they may otherwise have. Some examples that
scholars have posed are things like gang-related tattoo removal, abortions, even the treatment of
acne, that would improve the quality of life of inmates who already have so few liberties afforded to
them (Kipnis 2012; Sonenstein 2015a). The ACH also strictly limits over-prescription of drugs, arguing
that many of the medicines that doctors would normally give out are actually not necessary within
prisons and that they should avoid prescribing them wherever possible, even if it would directly
benefit the patient. Ultimately these examples prove the unnecessary and needlessly cruel boundaries
of correctional medicine. The goal of prisons is not to provide care, it is to maintain the dependent
relationship through which the prisoner is forced to accept the meager services they provide.
Further illustrating that the role of medical providers is more for health emergencies and providing
just enough care to allow prisoners to serve their sentence than it is for genuine, compassionate,
person-centered health care.
16

Dual Loyalty and Correctional Interests
Health care providers are bound to medical ethics that should ensure the same level of care
in all settings, including carceral ones. While providers may believe that they are acting in the
patient’s best interest, the loyalties of correctional medical providers—consciously or
unconsciously—are to the governing body in power and not to the patients for whom they allegedly
provide care. In his discussion of Fanon and the colonial situation in Algeria, Richard Keller (2007)
highlights that “one could serve colonial interests or medical interests, but not both: the adoption of
the colonial mantle necessarily meant the abandonment of Hippocratic commitment to patient care”
(p. 825). Pont et al. describe this same conflict of interest through what they term ‘dual loyalty,’
which describes the role conflict between duties to the patient and the “express or implied” interests
of a third party such as an employer or the state—which are the same entity in correctional facilities
(2012:475). Administrative faculty generally is concerned with security, obedience, and the reduction
of expenditures; the presence of these goals within prison administrations shapes their desires for
what the provision of medical care looks like under their watch.
This allegiance to the desires of the hegemonic power often manifests through correctional
physicians simply obeying the arbitrary rules put in place by the prison administration. By complying
with the denial of elective procedures, and by agreeing not to prescribe medicine that may
substantially help inmates, they are reinforcing that it is acceptable to deny patients care that is
outside of the scope of what the correctional administration thinks they deserve. In agreeing to the
punitive goals of the facility they also occasionally avoid practices that would benefit the community
health of the entire prison population. When intravenous injections are occurring in prisons despite
these actions being prohibited, the most beneficial public health approach would be to introduce
harm-reduction practices like needle exchange and distributing information on how to properly
clean needles. Because the prison wishes to punish rather than to heal, they do not allow medical
17

professionals working in their facilities to condone drug use in this way—even though criminalizing it
further does nothing for the safety of those involved (Kipnis 2012). I wish to once again highlight
that it does not matter if the healthcare professional feels good about this and wholeheartedly goes
along with it. Even when correctional healthcare providers recognize the dissonance between the
administration’s goals and the prisoners’ needs, as employees of the prison, these physicians exist in
collaboration with the state to uphold the carceral goals of punishment and control.

Distrust and Dehumanization
As such, prisoners are often under no illusion that the medical providers are acting in their
best interest. A large part of this stems from the role overlap in which primary care providers for
inmates are often utilized to perform surveillance tasks at the behest of their superiors—entirely
ignoring the aforementioned UN recommendation that their focus should be solely on patient care.
Pont et al. (2012) clarify:
the switch from a professional’s position of personal confidential caregiver with undivided
commitment to the prisoner patient to acting as a forensic or public health officer
accountable to the authorities—whose report might harm the patient—certainly is
detrimental to the patient’s trust, even if thoroughly explained. (p. 476)
How are patients expected to trust that the caregiver is working for them and their needs when they
are simultaneously taking samples for drug tests and doing cavity searches? These acts are clearly
ones where the provider reports the findings to the wardens and correctional officers, how is the
patient supposed to trust the confidentiality of their wellness visits? The distrust that the colonized
patient expresses towards the colonizer’s doctors are thus very similar to what occurs in prisons
because the understanding is the same: they do not work for the patients, they work for the
dominating power.
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The correctional medical situation mirrors the colonial medical situation in that the distrust
is both pervasive and reciprocal. Just as colonial doctors did not trust the reporting of the colonized
patient, incarcerated people’s conception as inherently untrustworthy leads to an overreliance on the
opinion of the doctor over and above that of the patient. Andrea Pitt’s 2015 piece echoes this
sentiment by establishing that medical and correctional staff “may deem themselves superior
knowers” because they do not believe that prisoners have the language or knowledge to discuss what
they are feeling and accurately request what they need (p. 285). I believe it is helpful in this segment
to continuously provide the support of specific instances and case studies to move these abuses of
power from the theoretical and highlight the very real impact this has on incarcerated patients. In
their extremely relevant piece on correctional healthcare, Pitts brings to light the story of a woman
whose concerns surrounding a gynecological procedure and her personal history of abuse were
laughed off by the attending correctional care provider. When the patient tried to tell the doctor that
she would need to be sedated for the procedure he shifted quickly from laughter, to not believing
her, to trying to guilt her out of it by acknowledging how many extra administrative steps he would
have to go through. While it is possible to spend pages and pages discussing this horrific dismissal
alone, I wish to highlight that ultimately she had her psychiatrist write a note to the doctor
explaining the exact same things that she had said in their visit and that was enough to make him
believe her and to take the extra steps without further complaint because, as the patient recognizes,
“[the psychiatrist’s] word carries weight” (Pitts 2018:19). There is something to be said about the
fact that the doctor trusted (or at least was administratively forced to trust) the word of a fellow
medical staff member, and it is frightening to consider the way the nonconsensual procedure would
have gone without another “professional” to back the patient up. The story of this patient is one of
many similar stories that also highlight that these incarcerated patients are seen as bodies, they are
seen as objects, as pieces of the red tape that are merely an inconvenience for the doctor rather than
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complex human beings with complex physical and emotional needs. Incarcerated patients recognize
this detached and disinterested approach of the correctional doctor, it becomes clear that their
medical needs are an inconvenience—and why ask for compassionate care when these prisoners
know they will not receive it? What the correctional and the colonial doctor may read as diffidence
or rigidity is the understanding that the doctor would not believe them even if they tried to convey
their needs.
It warrants discussion that prisoners make up a specific subset of the population that is
perceived as untrustworthy and manipulative by virtue of them having been incarcerated. The
presumed possibility that these patients may be lying, especially in pursuit of drugs, leads to an
increased dismissal of their needs. Since this stigma automatically treats patient reporting as
unworthy of serious consideration, the correctional physician will routinely rely solely on physical
examination. The whole picture of health concerns is often not visibly apparent, and assuming that a
patient is misrepresenting their pain can cause the physician to neglect very serious ailments
(Sonenstein 2015b).
Prisons serve as geographically bounded colonies holding some of the most marginalized
people in the United States; the overt, coordinated control of the administrative bodies governing
these facilities enacts the colonial relationship of domination and subjugation within their walls. The
enclosed nature of prisons provides the clearest example of an internal colony and the colonial
dynamics of oppression because it is easiest to assert control within total institutions. The common
assumption, however, is that there is a fundamental difference between “the brutality of prison life
and the allegedly autonomous norms” of healthcare that is provided to people outside of
correctional institutions (Ahrens 2015:1). The present argument seeks to clarify that the repressive
relationship in medicine exists outside of these walls as well through the same patterns of dogmatic
power and the intersubjective distrust this sows.
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CLINICAL HEALTHCARE
It is one thing to discuss the ethical conflict and dehumanization that occurs in correctional
settings: at some level, that feels fathomable because interrogations into prison abuses are increasingly
bringing this into the collective consciousness. It is more complicated to expose the flaws within the
institution of clinical healthcare in the United States as its injustices are often concealed by its potential
benefits. Highlighting the structural and deeply embedded flaws in institutions that provide necessary
services, such as healthcare, is a task that is both essential and formidable. I wish to clarify this position
by acknowledging that Fanon was a vocal supporter of medicine itself—he believed that the tools,
methods, and scientific practices that the French brought to Algeria were an objective good, but that
the amoral application and the systemic othering that governed the creation and dispersion of this care
gave it its oppressive structure (1965). It is essential to understand that medical advancements in the
United States, both presently and historically, are inseparable from the politics that determine who
controls them. I established earlier that internal colonialism functions to make the systemic
subjugation of Black people more covert than it was in the days of enslavement, segregation, and
restricted civil rights. In the same way, the convoluted and dehumanizing medical care that
disproportionately harms Black Americans in contemporary clinical settings is no less unethical than
that which takes place in prisons: it merely manifests in subtler ways.

Dual Loyalty and Bureaucratic Boundaries
This section intends to highlight the flaws in the structure of healthcare itself, over and above
the effects of interpersonal doctor-patient relationships. The complicated and piecemeal network of
healthcare in the United States prioritizes profit above medical ethics and relies on labyrinthine
systems that force dependency (Supri and Malone 2011). Medicine currently operates in the United
States as a network that is vast and decentralized in a way that is obscure and difficult to navigate;
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more specifically it is “comprised of a myriad of large and powerful organizations, including insurance
companies, Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), corporate for-profit hospital chains, and
pharmaceutical companies” that must communicate among themselves and with the patient in order
to achieve care that is even somewhat comprehensive (Supri and Malone 2011:192). Not only does
this make it difficult to maintain continuity of care (i.e., providers that are consistently involved in all
that is going on with your health), but this disjointed assemblage of for-profit organizations is also
logistically and financially daunting to navigate. Considering healthcare as a system rather than
focusing on individual actors highlights the impact of “institutions, markets, and health care delivery
systems” that govern the business of healthcare (Metzl and Roberts 2014:675); this section will elaborate
the way that the business of healthcare leads to decreased commitment to altruistic medical ethics and
maintains healthcare as an exclusive service.
The previous section established Pont et al.’s concept of dual loyalty through correctional
medical providers’ commitment to serving the needs of the prison above the needs of their patients.
The full definition provided in Pont et al.’s 2012 piece defines dual loyalty as “clinical role conflict
between professional duties to a patient and obligations, express or implied, to the interests of a third
party such as an employer, an insurer, or the state” (475, emphasis added). Carceral caregivers’ loyalty
to the correctional administration demonstrated allegiance to an entity that is both the employer and
the state. This section will illuminate that loyalty to the insurer—and the mere existence of an insurer
as a mediating factor—in clinical healthcare settings likewise leads to inadequate and inequitable
patient care. Edmund Pellegrino discusses this conflict in his ruminations on systems of managed care
and how they force physicians to contain medical costs, stating succinctly that “any system of managed
care, by its nature, places the good of the patient into conflict with … (1) the good of all the other
patients served by the plan; [and] (2) the good of the plan and the organization, themselves, as
expressed in the limits they place on care” (1994:506). Because of the way the institution of medicine—
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more specifically, its funding—is set up, care providers are beholden to convoluted and rigid systems
of insurance whose main goal is profit and the reduction of expenditures. Using bureaucratic
terminology is insidious when the expenditures it refers to are services that directly affect patients’
lives.
Insurance establishes a system of forced reliance by mediating healthcare in such a way that
people cannot opt out—by privileging those who have the financial and cultural capital to navigate it,
this system makes care disproportionately inaccessible for Black Americans. Historically, “working for
an employer who provided health insurance was the most realistic route to coverage for the uninsured”
(Flores and Vargas 2017:2057). While other options are gradually becoming available for attaining at
least some level of insurance coverage, such as state coverage and increasing expansions to Medicaid,
job-provided insurance plans remain one of the major options for comprehensive coverage. This
means that disproportionately high rates of unemployment among Black Americans compound
inequality through the disparate provision of health insurance (Flores and Vargas 2017). Bonnie
Bullough’s research on how poverty and race affect access to, and usage of, preventative healthcare
further demonstrates that though there are alternative routes to insurance (e.g., Head Start, state
programs, and Medicaid), their unique and rigid criteria for eligibility “results in spotty coverage and
means that free care is not necessarily available for every mother and child who needs it” (1972:351).
The existence of alternative routes to coverage does not guarantee accessibility, nor are these alternatives
direct substitutes for employer-provided plans. With a lack of truly universal access to care, these less
comprehensive programs are often the only choice—forcing already subordinated populations to
accept any plan that provides them some healthcare because their only other option would be to have
none. The intentionally confusing and fragmentary configuration of insurance markets adversely
affects those who have not been trained or do not have the time to navigate it—inequitably affecting
non-white, working-class Americans (Supri and Malone 2011).
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By complying with the boundaries dictated by insurance companies and fee-for-service care,
medical professionals uphold the profit-driven structure of U.S. healthcare. Medical care is inextricably
tied to the political institutions that govern it and control who has access to it. The refusal of the
United States government to provide access to free, universal healthcare is in itself a tactic that
systemically oppresses people of color; the obedience of medical providers to the current unethical
structure illustrates that their loyalty will always be to each other, rather than to the people for whom
they allegedly provide care. Actively upholding boundaries that are antithetical to patient needs is not
a neutral act. Just as Fanon was adamant that colonial doctors could not be simultaneously loyal to
the patients and to the colonial mantle (1965:852), obeying the boundaries of care that are dictated by
the bureaucracy of healthcare—at both the organizational and governmental level—means that the
loyalty will never solely be to the patient.

Distrust and Dehumanization
The deep distrust of physicians that was held by colonized Algerians and is currently held by
those incarcerated in U.S. prisons stems from the understanding that even the most compassionate
caregiver among them operates within institutions that treat them as objects to be controlled. The
present argument would be remiss if it did not acknowledge the endemic medical mistreatment and
abuse that has targeted Black people throughout the history of the United States. Slavery as an
economic system established Black people as tools to be used for their labor, the accompanying racist
ideology considered Black people to be subhuman and used this to justify treating them as objects in
every context. The medical profession in the antebellum period attempted to advance medical
knowledge through the “use of slaves and free Black people as subjects for dissection and medical
experimentation” (Gamble 1997:1774). Painful, nonconsensual procedures done without anesthesia
were commonplace, and even the bodies of deceased Black people were frequently exhumed to be
24

used to satisfy the whims of the white doctor (Gamble 1997). The abolition of slavery and the
provision of legal civil rights ultimately established that medical ethics must also apply to Black
Americans, which helped to reduce some of the most overt medical exploitation. This mistreatment
certainly did not disappear, however; it just became less consistently documented. Black folklore
following the Civil War provides some of the clearest recounting of how the threat—both real and
perceived—of medical abuse continued to haunt them (Gamble 1997). This limited summary of some
of the earliest abuses is intended to demonstrate that U.S. medical care originated with the complete
disregard for the humanity and personhood of Black people and the abuse of their bodies and souls
to benefit the medical care of white people.
Despite eventually attaining nominally the same medical rights as white people, ethical
standards have historically been inconsistently applied—to the detriment of Black people’s health,
safety, and faith in medical institutions. One of the most well-known examples of this flagrant harm
is the Tuskegee Syphilis Study: where Black male participants were misled, lied to about their own
health, and “deliberately denied effective treatment for syphilis in order to document the natural
history of the disease” (Gamble 1997:1773). This study ran from 1932 to 1972 and displays the same
conscious disregard for the health of Black people and the prioritization of their bodies as
experimentation sites as had been seen in the centuries prior. In 1997, twenty-five years after the
atrocious details of the Tuskegee study came to light, President Clinton issued a formal apology for
the experiment and acknowledged the distrust of the healthcare system that it had caused; it remains
arguably the salient example, one that “has come to symbolize racism in medicine, misconduct in
human research, the arrogance of physicians, and government abuse of Black people” (Gamble 1997:
1773). While it is impossible to convey the depth and pervasiveness of these atrocities with due rigor
within the scope of this paper, it is essential to acknowledge the historical and ancestral trauma that
exists for Black Americans seeking healthcare today and to understand that contemporary care as it
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exists today cannot be separated from its past abuse. This is the foundation of clinical healthcare in
the United States: it has never been moral, it has never been impartial, and it has never been separate
from its social and political context.
Anti-Black abuse within medicine is often understood to be a piece of the history of healthcare,
but the exploitation and manipulation of Black bodies was one of the primary tools used by white
doctors in their attempts to advance medical knowledge. Misrepresenting racism in medical care as
merely a peripheral occurrence obscures the extant impact of racialized knowledge. Metzl and Roberts
(2014) further elucidate this via three case studies that illustrate the complex interrelationship between
“extraclinical stigma, socioeconomic factors, and politics,” and trends of diagnosis and treatment (p.
675). In the 1960s and 1970s, Black men were diagnosed with schizophrenia “65 percent more
frequently” than white men (Metzl and Roberts 2014:675). The initial assumption was that
miscommunication and mistrust during the clinical encounter had caused this disparity, but education
initiatives to counter clinician bias did not have any effect on the trend. Further analysis revealed that
this overdiagnosis occurred in large part because the second edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual (DSM) changed the description of schizophrenia to “a condition of ‘hostility,’ ‘aggression,’
and projected anger” (Metzl and Roberts 2014:676). Defining schizophrenia in this way led not only
to overdiagnosis, but to over-prescription of drugs like Haldol that promised “cooperation” from the
Black men that were “assaultive and belligerent” (Metzl and Roberts 2014: 677). Prior to this new
definition, however, schizophrenia was considered a mental illness of secluded, sensitive
housewives—illustrating the way clinical diagnosis and its prescribed treatment are not impartial nor
constant. Metzl and Roberts clarify that this historical example “resulted neither primarily from
individual doctors’ biases nor from the actions or symptoms of patients… rather, it reflected a series
of structural shifts in the framing of mental illness that incorporated racially and politically inflected
terminology” (2014:678). Ascribing these terms to their Black patients, then, was not an example of
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individual bias but rather medical professionals obeying and upholding the bias that was embedded in
the diagnostic structure. This case is just one example of racialized language and stereotypes being
embedded in medicine’s very tools, the symptoms it looks for, and the treatment it prescribes. Medical
diagnostic tools and treatment methods are formed, created, and discovered within a specific racial,
social, and political context—their socially constructed nature means they are neither neutral nor
impartially applied.
Despite the highly subjective nature of medical knowledge, clinical healthcare often assumes
that reliance on scientific “objectivity” is a viable method of achieving ethical healthcare. The
dominant diagnostic model of modern clinical care has been the bio-medical approach, “in which
doctors isolate patients from their psycho–social world and reduce them into a diseased organ or an
impaired gene” (Coşkun 2015:33). Relying primarily on the body to encapsulate and accurately relay
the whole story of a patient’s health stems from the belief that the body contains all the necessary
evidence, and the clinician must assume the role of detective. Under this approach, the provider uses
an “objectifying touch” in pursuit of what they consider “more objective and therefore more reliable
data than subjective patient accounts of symptoms” (Leder in Pitts 2018:23). As medical technology
has become more widely available and more heavily utilized, diagnostic techniques have retained this
same character but have led to a more “absent touch” as professionals rely on scans and laboratory
results to relay data regarding patient needs (Leder in Pitts 2018:23).
This approach presumes that reading the body on its own makes it easier to separate physical
needs from social attributes of the patient that may prompt biased treatment—such as race or
socioeconomic status. Placing this in conversation with the earlier discussion of the colonial clinical
relationship, Fanon highlighted that the colonial doctor likewise “fell back on the clinical examination”
and acted as a “veterinarian” to the colonized patient (1965:126, 127). The colonial doctor’s belief that
the Algerian patients did not understand their own health or needs was justification for the doctor to
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treat them as objects: reinforcing the power dynamics that prevented truly person-centered medical
care. In the contemporary United States, as in the colonial context, approaching the patient as a body
rather than a person strips them of their positionality and ignores the myriad complex social factors
that are integral to a complete understanding of their health. Rather than ignoring critical facets that
affect patient health, Dr. Camara Phyllis Jones advocates an even more comprehensive consideration
of these elements. Jones asserts that it is not enough to consider race as a characteristic, or as a
demographic box to be checked; she posits that race is only valuable if it is understood as something
that actively affects the health of patients through racism at the personal, interpersonal, and institutional
level (2002). Metzl and Roberts likewise advocate a move towards ‘structural competency’ which
acknowledges the broader structural contexts that impact patient health, such as “health care and food
delivery systems, zoning laws, local politics, urban and rural infrastructures, structural racisms, or even
the very definitions of illness and health” (2014:674). Combatting dehumanization and objectification
in healthcare cannot be achieved through further depersonalization. Allowing healthcare to
systematically separate body from person in an attempt to achieve some ideal of impartiality that has
never existed in medicine will only uphold the oppressive structure of its application.

CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have proposed the use of Frantz Fanon’s theoretical work to engage with the
function of the institution of medicine in the United States. Colonial contexts, in general, provide an
understanding of dominance that demonstrates the enormous power of the governing body to
define and constrain every aspect of the lives of those under their control. Considering medical
institutions as an arm of the dominant authority allows for greater scrutiny regarding their principles,
the boundaries that are placed on care, and who those boundaries affect.
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Through an analysis of both correctional and clinical healthcare, this inquiry has clarified that
medical oppression does not simply exist on its own; medicine as an institution actively and
systemically oppresses people. Created, defined, and applied by the dominant authority, medical
knowledge and medical care are neither objective nor neutral. I have argued that it is essential to
ground medical institutions in their specific sociopolitical context because treating them as infallible
and unchangeable upholds the myth that their care is impartial. Questioning how the boundaries of
care affect people and assessing whether these effects are equitable is critical to achieving truly just
healthcare.
Given the difficulty of noticing and appraising these same dynamics in the country and in
the sociopolitical context with which one is familiar, I advocate for the use of Fanon and scholars
like him in order to call attention to oppression in noncolonial contexts. It is only through
elucidating asymmetrical and coercive power dynamics that we can set about dismantling these
unjust systems and begin truly providing what medicine intends to: care for all who need it.
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